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I. INTRODUCTION
To understand communications surveillance law is to try to resolve the
three-body problem of simultaneously comprehending law, policy, and
technology while at least two of the three may be changing at any moment in
time. This makes it one of the more exciting domains for scholars, analysts, and
technologists, but it is also one of the most challenging.
Communications surveillance is a rapidly shifting landscape from the
perspectives of policy and technology. Governments across the world are
deploying new techniques and technologies with alarming speed. We are
achieving new levels of surveillance, quickly approaching what Justice
Brandeis warned about when he said that "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching
means of invading privacy have become available to the Government," and that
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"[d]iscovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means
far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet."' There is a rapidly growing market in
communications surveillance technologies that can conduct surveillance in
ways that just ten years ago were well beyond the limits of our technology and
often our imaginations.
With widespread innovations in policy and technology across the world,
what is most surprising is how old-fashioned our legislation is, and in turn, our
safeguards. Many communications surveillance laws were drafted in the 1980s
and 1990s, with updates in the 1990s and early 2000s. 2 Many countries across
the world are still introducing laws on communications surveillance, but their
models are quite old, often borrowing language from laws from the 1990s (in
the case of U.S. and UK law) and international conventions such as the Council
of Europe Cybercrime Convention of 2001.3 They all ban interception of
communications content, grant exceptions to government agencies, permit
access to information about the communications (so-called communications
metadata), establish authorization and oversight regimes, and permit
government to order communications service providers to provide capabilities
for lawful intercept and/or access.4 But they are not keeping pace with the new
forms of advanced surveillance techniques and policies being deployed.
In this Article we will draw out the modern landscape of surveillance policy
and technologies (Part I). The deployment of new techniques and technologies
is being done without new legal frameworks, and as such, we must resort to
relying on older frameworks that may be unable to understand these new
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (amending and
updating Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, commonly
called the Wiretap Act); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012))
(further amending the Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act in 1994); Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (further amending the Wiretap Act and Stored
Communications Act); Interception of Communications Act (IOCA), 1985, c. 56 (Eng.)
(regulating the interception of communications); Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
(RIPA), 2000, c. 23 (Eng.) (replacing IOCA); Telecommunications (Interception Capability)
Act 2004 (Act No. 19/2004) (N.Z.); Loi relative A la protection de la vie priv6e contre les
6coutes, la prise de connaissance et l'enregistrement de communications et de
t616communications priv6es of June 30, 1994, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of
Belgium], Jan. 24, 1995, 01542.
3 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm.
4 See, e.g., Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications (Wiretap Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012); RIPA, 2000, c. 23;
Telecommunications Act, 2004 (N.Z.); Regulation of Interception of Communications and
Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002 § 5 (S. Afr.).
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techniques, or constitutional safeguards that have a long and troubled history
with innovation (Part II). Using the example of the lack of legislative activity in
the United States, we look at how lower courts are trying to resolve the Fourth
Amendment concerns inherent in some of these techniques, and make
suggestions regarding how we believe current law should be applied (Part III).
We are in a moment of great uncertainty characterized by the absence of
legislative activity implementing real safeguards, use of new communications
surveillance capabilities often in secretive ways, and courts grappling to
understand new technologies. Laws, technologies, and the courts have, until
now, maintained a delicate balance on communications surveillance; when new
technologies posed new threats, often the courts or the legislative bodies would
respond. If one branch failed, another would usually pick up the gauntlet. After
the U.S. Supreme Court decided that interception of communications did not
qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment in 1928,5 Congress responded
in the 1930s with strict controls. 6 In the 1960s the Supreme Court and Congress
fed off one another to develop jurisprudence7 and legislation.8 Responding to
abuses in the 1970s, Congress enacted new laws, 9 and when the Supreme Court
decided against protecting certain metadata,' 0 Congress responded with rules on
"trap and trace" and "pen registers."" Unfortunately, we are currently seeing a
lack of interest in safeguards from Congress and other legislatures around the
world, while technical capabilities are expanding. There is even speculation that
the Foreign Intelligence Security Court is being activist in enabling
surveillance.12 It is high time to reintroduce safeguards into the conversation,
and to apply them against technologies that are increasingly used to conduct
directed and mass surveillance of our sensitive information.
A. A Brief History of Communications Surveillance
Communications surveillance is almost as old as our ability to
communicate.13 While our attempts to regulate that surveillance are more
recent, they still lag behind the pace of technological innovation. Scholars thus
5 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
6 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
7 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012)) (containing Title III,
commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act).
9 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
10 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
11 See ECPA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1868.
12 See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2013, at Al.
13 For a history of communication surveillance going back to the Egyptians, see
generally DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS: THE STORY OF SECRET WRITING (1967).
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struggle to understand how to resolve modem forms of communications
surveillance with older legal frameworks. For instance, our abilities to
comprehend what a constitutional statement about a right to privacy actually
means may be linked with the state of surveillance at the time.
Efforts to monitor communications are of course linked to our methods of
communicating. With letters and post came the interception of postal
communications. With the advent of property rights, people kept their received
written communications at home, and these could be seized upon entry.14
Communications within the home, in the form of interactions with other people,
required secret surveillance through informants, and with technological
innovation-bugs. 15 Intercepting packages and letters gave way to requiring
telegraph offices to monitor communications, or more directly tapping wires.
This was repeated with telephones, involving the actions of operators, or
directly tapping the wire, or installing listening devices at one end.16
Much of the modem debate about communications surveillance focuses on
the institutions implicated in such monitoring. Historically, in many countries,
the government, or monopolies with close ties to the government, ran the postal
services; and this often continued into the telegraph era. 17 As a result, the
government didn't necessarily need to pass laws to compel a company to
comply with interception requests because these companies were operating at
the mercy of the government, even as an arm of the government. The telephone
system was operated for the most part in a similar way to the telegraph and the
post: a limited number of companies or a government agency responsible for
administering the service, which could also be responsible for administering
surveillance.18
Market innovations created policy challenges in this system, leading to
policy change. As the industry of communications service provision became
more diverse, whether by deregulation of telephone services or through the rise
of mobile phone services, the relationships with governments became more
complicated. Companies without pre-existing relationships with governments
sought legislative cover for helping governments with surveillance. Equally,
14 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
15 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
572 (2009).
16 The Katz case in 1967, though famously known for its comments on interception of
communications, was actually a case of placing a listening device in a telephone booth. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
17 For an interesting historical note about Lincoln's ability to monitor all telegraphic
activity in the United States during the Civil War, see generally David T.Z. Mindich,
Lincoln's Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2013, at A17.
18 For an interesting history of surveillance of telecommunications in the United
Kingdom, see Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, 18-35
(1984). For a list of the national security agreements between the United States and
telephone and cable companies, see US. Government Foreign Telecommunications
Providers Network Security Agreements, PUB. INTELLIGENCE (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter
PUB. INTELLIGENCE], http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas.
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companies who were identified publicly for closely cooperating with
governments sought legal protections for having done so. 19 With the rise of
human rights and civil liberties concerns, we saw the emergence of laws on
communications surveillance, providing a legal basis for monitoring.
These laws were not being drafted just to provide privacy safeguards and
legal cover. While they initially may have regulated snooping, eventually these
laws shifted towards enabling surveillance programs. Policy developments
leading to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in the
United States in the early 1990s, and many laws across the world in the late
1990s and early 2000s, focused on developing interception capabilities:
requiring companies to provide access to communications, without regard to the
technologies. 20 Wire "tapping" was no longer a reasonable way for gaining
access to communications content because of the increased sophistication of
telecommunications systems; and Internet communications couldn't be
"intercepted" in the same way. As a result, governments mandated that
companies could be ordered to provide access to communications content.21
In the early to mid-2000s, new programs emerged to ensure capture of
communications metadata. Information about who is communicating with
whom and when is generated as a by-product of transferring communications
content. This data may reside in logs held at service providers, or may be
embedded within the communications content. The ability of governments to
gain access to this information also changed with the shift in technologies and
the market. In the earlier phases of telephone communications, gaining access to
this information required the use of "trap and trace" and "pen register"
technologies at telephone companies. 22 With changes in billing, technologies
capturing this information became relevant to the companies themselves; so the
policy focus turned to providing government access to these logs. But
companies may not necessarily keep these logs for as long as governments
want, and in the early to mid-2000s governments began introducing "data
19 The Protect America Act of 2007 provided for retroactive immunity for companies,
out of a concern that "the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful
Government requests in the future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted
litigation." White House Office of Commcn's, Retroactive Liability Protection Is Critical to
Our National Security, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE (July 8, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/
1l/docs/fisa-factsheet-070808.pdf. The FISA Amendments Act made this immunity
permanent. For a historical example, see the history of Operation Shamrock from the 1940s,
under which the executives of ITT, RCA, and Western Union agreed to cooperate with the
U.S. Government in exchange for protections against prosecution. JAMES BAMFORD, THE
SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON
AMERICA 165-68 (2008).
20 See Council Resolution (EC) No. 96/C of 17 Jan. 1995 O.J. (C 329) 2; RIPA, 2000,
c. 23 (Eng.) (replacing IOCA); Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act 2004 (Act
No. 19/2004) (N.Z.); Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002 § 5 (S. Afr.).
21 See sources cited supra note 20.22 See infra text accompanying notes 164-66.
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retention" laws, requiring companies to keep these logs for extended periods of
time. 23
Up until this point, access to communications content and metadata
(hereafter "communications surveillance") was for the most part targeted. Due
to resource limitations, in that we didn't have enough ears to listen to enough
conversations, monitoring was limited to specific individuals or groups. As the
communications infrastructure became more complex, new communications
companies stepped in that didn't have the same old relationships with
governments, the rate of communications increased, and they became
increasingly digital. Surveillance arguably became more challenging for
governments after years of gaining access to more information. New programs
were developed, alongside new powers and new technologies, permitting less
targeted approaches to communications surveillance. 24 Where previously an
intelligence agency could be overwhelmed trying to monitor the
communications of vast groups of people, we are now seeing that intelligence
agencies have been monitoring the communications metadata of entire
populations 25 and tapping the fiber optic cables that connect continents to gain
direct access to data flows.26 As these resource limitations were being erased,
some laws were being changed to accommodate this new approach.27
23 See Council Directive 2006/24, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, 56 (EC) on the retention
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending
Council Directive 2002/58/EC; see also A. Michael Froomkin, "PETs Must Be on a Leash":
How U.S. Law (and Industry Practice) Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable
Privacy Enhancing Technology, 74 OHIo ST. L.J. 965, 977-78 (2013).
24 Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?, NEW
YORKER, May 23, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/23/110523fa-fact
mayer.
25 See, e.g., Jacques Follorou & Franck Johann~s, In English: Revelations on the
French Big Brother, SOcIETE (July 4, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/07/
04/revelations-on-the-french-big-brother_34426653224.html; Glenn Greenwald, NSA
Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
26 See Ewen MacAskill et al., GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables for Secret Access to
World's Communications, GUARDIAN, June 21, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/
jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa (reporting that the UK's spy agency,
GCHQ, accesses undersea fiber optic cables to obtain communications); NSA Slides Explain
the PRISM Data-Collection Program, WASH. POST, July 10, 2013 [hereinafter PRISM Data-
Collection], http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-docu
ments/ (including a slide that highlights "[c]ollection of communications on fiber cables and
infrastructure as data flows past").
27 FISA was amended in 2008 to include a new, broad provision allowing for the
collection of information regarding non-U.S. persons outside of the United States. See 50
U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). In order to undertake such monitoring, U.S. intelligence agencies
need not specify the person or premises they intend to target. Instead, they merely must
assure the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that a significant purpose of the
surveillance will be to obtain foreign intelligence information and that U.S. persons will not
be intentionally targeted. Id.
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The value of communications surveillance increased dramatically in this
time as well. More of our societal interactions took place over and through
modem communications infrastructure, sometimes without our knowledge. If
we carry a mobile phone, our mobile network provider logs our locations; more
of our interactions with friends, families, and colleagues results in a log, and
increasingly a stored communication.28 The sensitivity of this data has
increased. Whereas previously metadata was often dismissed as being low value
information, 29 it now constitutes information about everyone we've known,
every place we've been, every item we've read, every information resource
we've been interested in; and can be used to derive information about our
present and future conduct. 30
Interestingly, in 1928, when the Supreme Court was considering the
Olmstead case, telephone companies apparently urged the Court to rule that
government should not conduct wiretapping. 31 Professor Orin Kerr assumes that
this was to encourage customers to use the telephone and keep government
from interfering with their networks. 32 Now we are dealing with situations
where so many requests are received that companies have developed web
interfaces to give law enforcement agents direct access. 33 And these
communications technologies are so ubiquitous that if people were not to use
them, they would be socially and economically excluded.
We are also seeing another era of policy innovation. The building of
monitoring capabilities into technologies, and the compulsion to cooperate and
even retain information are no longer considered sufficient as communications
may cross borders. Older laws compelling government access failed to consider
cross-jurisdictional Internet communications (or actively excluded them).34
Instead, they presumed citizens would communicate using telephone services
provided by domestic companies. Even if they did consider email, they
presumed that domestic companies were providing email services. Now
communications between two citizens of a single country are likely to involve
service providers in other countries.35 It is more difficult for a government to
2 8 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 151 (2013).2 9 This is separate to the legal treatment, to be discussed in Part II.3 0 See, as examples, a review of Sandy Petland's work, Kate Greene, TRIO: Reality
Mining, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar.-Apr. 2008), http://www2.technologyreview.com/article/409
598/triO-reality-mining/, and also see Alberto Escudero-Pascual & Ian Hosein, Questioning
Lawful Access to Traffic Data, 47 COMM. ACM 77, 81 (2004).
31 Kerr, supra note 15, at 598.3 21d.
33 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 121 (2012).
34 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2) (2012) (assistance capability requirements, excludes
information services and private networks, long assumed to refer to the Internet).
35 For instance, in 2012, Google stated it had 425 million active Gmail users
worldwide. See Dante D'Orazio, Gmail Now Has 425 Million Active Users, VERGE (June 28,
2013] 1077
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reach into these foreign jurisdictions and to establish relationships with every
company.
Since the mid-2000s, democratic governments have been proposing new
policies to resolve this dilemma. One such policy is to require domestic service
providers to actively collect information on all users' activities. Whereas
previously providers were asked to grant access to content on a targeted basis,
and to retain collected metadata on an untargeted basis, domestic
communications carriers, such as providers of cable services, are now being
asked to monitor all information that flows through their infrastructure in order
to determine what people are doing on communications services in other
countries. For instance, currently, in order for the British police to monitor who
is emailing whom on Google they must go through the arduous process of
getting Google in California to respond. 36 Instead, the British government has
proposed requiring all Internet service providers in the UK to monitor all
interactions by all Internet users to identify the activities of UK-based users of
foreign service providers, to collect and retain the information on who is
communicating with whom, when, and where. 37 When originally introduced in
the UK, it was proposed that the national intelligence agency would store all
this information. This policy was rejected. 38 But we are now realizing that the
centralized storage of communications metadata, even for Internet services, is
already occurring in some other countries, including the United States39 and
India.40
2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/6/28/3123643/gmail-425-million-total-
users. With Google's servers located in the United States and a handful of other countries, it
is likely most of those users' communications are at some point routed outside of their
country of origin. See Data Center Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.co.uk/about/data
centers/inside/locations/index.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2013). See generally Dennis
Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules Through Sector-Based
Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029 (2013).
36 This can be through voluntary measures, or through Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties. See, e.g., Transparency Report: User Data Requests, GOOGLE, http://www.
google.com/transparencyreportluserdatarequests/legalprocess/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
37 See INTELLIGENCE & SEC. COMM., ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS DATA BY THE
INTELLIGENCE AND SECuRTY AGENCIES, 2013, Cm. 8514, 58 (U.K.) [hereinafter ACCESS
TO COMMUNICATIONS DATA], available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/
cm85/8514/8514.pdf.
38 Press Release, Liberty (Nat'l Council for Civil Liberties), Liberty Welcomes
Government Climb-Down on Centralised Communications Database (Apr. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2009/liberty-welcomes-
govemment-climb-down-on-centralised-communications.php. The Mastering the Internet
programme, however, was established around the same time as this "climb-down."
Christopher Williams, Jacqui's Secret Plan To "Master the Internet," REGISTER (May 3,
2009), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/05/03/gchqmti/.
39 See, e.g., Press Release from James R. Clapper, Dir. Nat'l Intelligence, DNI
Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information (June 6, 2013),
available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-20
13/868-dni-statement-on-recent-unauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information?tmpl=
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Another emerging policy is to allow governments to gain access through
other means to information resources in other countries. Put simply,
governments are seeking to conduct searches across borders, even if this
involves the malicious hacking of computers in other jurisdictions. The Dutch
Government is proposing a law that will allow the police to break into
computers and mobile phones, both within the Netherlands and abroad, in order
to install spyware and search and destroy data.41 The Council of Europe has
recently proposed action in this area, seeking to develop a Draft Protocol to its
Cybercrime Convention to permit cross-border searches. 42
Safeguards are rarely mentioned as governments introduce these new
policies. In fact, these policies are not always openly discussed. Meanwhile
technological innovations make even more new and diverse forms of
communications surveillance possible.
component&format=pdf (confirming the United States is collecting and maintaining records
of the information described in the leaked Verizon court order).
40 See the analysis from The Centre for Internet & Society, Maria Xynou, India's "Big
Brother": The Central Monitoring System (CMS), CENTRE FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y (Apr. 8,
2013), http://www.cis-india.org/intemet-governance/blog/indias-big-brother-the-central-mo
nitoring-system. Subsequent reporting includes India: New Monitoring System Threatens
Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 7, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/india-new-
monitoring-system-threatens-rights; Dhruva Jaishankar, Beyond Snowden: US Surveillance
System a Useful Model for Democratic, Terror-Hit India, EcON. TIMES (June 27, 2013, 2:07
AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/comments-analysis/beyond-snowden-us-
surveillance-system-a-useful-model-for-democratic-terror/hit-India/articleshow/20788044.
cms; Srikant Jayanthan, Central Monitoring System Put Off till December, Telecom Test Lab
to October, EcON. TIMES (June 21, 2013, 4:27 AM), http://articles.economictimes.
indiatimes.com/2013-06-21/news/401192151_national-telecom-policy-telecom-network-
telecom-equipment.
41Dutch Police May Get Right To Hack in Cyber Crime Fight, BBC NEWS (May 2,
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22384145; Door Ton Siedsma, Dutch
Hacking Proposal Puts Citizens at Risk, BITS FREEDOM (May 2, 2013, 12:51 PM),
https://www.bof.nl/2013/05/02/dutch-hacking-proposal-puts-citizens-at-risk/.
42 In June 2013, the Council of Europe hosted a meeting of civil society and industry to
consult on the proposal. A useful summary is provided by EDRi in its EDRi-gram 11.11 of
June 5, 2013 in Transborder Data Access: Strong Critics on Plans To Extend CoE
Cybercrime Treaty, EDRI (June 5, 2013), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number1 1.11/trans
border-data-access-cybercrime-treaty. The current convention in article 32(b) already states
that one government (a Party)
may, without the authorisation of another Party, access or receive, through a computer
system in its territory, stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains
the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose
the data to the Party through that computer system.
Id. The Council of Europe is consulting on a draft protocol that would remove the
requirement that a computer system be "in its territory." The authors have been in
communication with the U.S. Department of Justice regarding these consultations.
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B. Modern Communications Surveillance Techniques
Surveillance policies and surveillance technologies are intertwined. The
adoption of the telephone required the development of "wire tapping"
techniques. When telephony grew more advanced, industry was enticed through
subsidies43 and standards44 to develop the capability for government to monitor
communications. Mobile telecommunications and digital communications,
particularly those involving the Internet, required new interception innovations
to match the previous capabilities of government programs, and to match new
ambitions.
Over the past two years, privacy advocates and journalists have been
investigating the modern surveillance technology industry. Through attending
trade shows and conducting other investigations, we have collectively
uncovered a significant market in new techniques of communications
surveillance. 45
We have identified at least three types of communications surveillance
technologies that are now being developed by companies and deployed in
various cities and countries around the world.
1. Targeted Use of Offensive Technologies
Rather than conducting searches of computers and mobile phones upon
seizure, through the use of surveillance backdoors and vulnerabilities the users
of these technologies are able to gain access to a device, whether a computer or
a smartphone, through surreptitious means, often at a distance. Using
vulnerabilities in our operating systems and applications, these systems then
enable governments to monitor all activities on the device, including all
keystrokes; 46 and to execute commands including conducting searches of
43 CALEA created a $500 million fund to help American telecommunications
companies make their switches wiretap ready. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACT: AUDIT REPORT, at i (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/re
ports/FBI/a0613/final.pdf. The funds had been spent by 2002, though the FBI estimated in
2006 that only ten to twenty percent of the wireline switches, and approximately fifty
percent of the pre-1995 and ninety percent of the post-1995 wireless switches, respectively,
have CALEA software activated and thus are considered CALEA-compliant. Id. at 97-98.
44 At the same time as CALEA was being finalized, the European Union in 1995
developed a resolution calling for lawful intercept standards. Council Resolution (EC) No.
96/C of 17 Jan. 1995 O.J. (C 329) 2 (on the lawful interception of telecommunications). The
European Telecommunications Standards Institute subsequently developed these standards
which are now built into European telecommunications technology.
45 See generally Sari Horwitz, Shyamantha Asokan & Julie Tate, Trade in Surveillance
Technology Raises Worries, WASH. PoST, Dec. 1, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2011-12-0 1/world/35286192_1_surveillance-technology-first-trade-show-products.
46 This is akin to the technique used in the case of United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp.
2d 572, 574 (D.N.J. 2001). However, that case involved surreptitious physical access to the
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material on the devices, and turning on microphones and cameras. Some of the
leading systems are developed by Gamma International 47 and Hacking Team.4 8
2. Targeted and Semi-targeted Use of Mobile Phone Surveillance
Rather than targeting mobile phone communications by approaching
telephone network providers, it is possible to actively monitor mobile
communications in the field. This is commonly done by using a device that
impersonates a high priority base station for mobile communications. These
devices can be small enough to be carried around49 or even affixed to a drone.
One implementation of this technique is commonly referred to as an "IMSI
catcher."50 By impersonating a base station, all mobile phones on that network
in that area will connect to the monitoring device rather than the legitimate
network. The device can therefore identify all phones within range. In a more
advanced implementation, they can also enable direct access to communications
content and metadata by routing calls through the base station. Key providers
include Cobham PLC, NeoSoft AG, 5 1 Ability,5 2 and View Systems. 53
office of Scarfo using a search warrant, and the use was limited to identifying the password
to a specific resource, an encrypted file. Id The case was not appealed.
47 FinFisher control servers have been found in Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei,
Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Qatar, Serbia, Singapore, Turkmenistan, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam. MORGAN MARQUIS-BOIRE ET
AL., THE CITIZEN LAB, YOU ONLY CLICK TWICE: FINFISHER's GLOBAL PROLIFERATION 1
(2013), available at https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/15-2013-youonly
clicktwice.pdf.
48 Hacking Team's technology has been implicated in the surveillance of Mamfakinch,
a journalist collective in Morocco. MORGAN MARQUIS-BOIRE, THE CITIZEN LAB,
BACKDOORS ARE FOREVER: HACKING TEAM AND THE TARGETING OF DISSENT? 1 (2012),
available at https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/12-2012-backdoorsarefor
ever.pdf.
49 Some companies sell a "wearable" form of the technology.
50 An International Mobile Subscriber Identity is a unique identifier that is carried on
the phone or in the SIM card (depending on the network) and is sent to the network for
connectivity.
5 1NEOSOFT, CATALOGUE 2009: SYSTEMS 9-10 (2009), available at http://www.neo
soft.ch/support/download/catalog systems.pdf ("The Compact GSM Base unit forces GSM
phones in its vicinity to register with it. Unlike others IMSIIMEI catchers NS-17-1 does not
need to transmit very powerful signals in order to force GSM phones to make the handover
from the real GSM network into this micro network .... The system operates invisibly, so
that the mobile station subscriber is unable to detect it. The system does not interfere with
the external mobile GSM networks.").
52 Active GSM Interceptor, ABILITY, http://www.interceptors.com/intercept-solutions/
Active-GSM-Interceptor.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) ("The IBIS-II extracts easily and
in short time the mobiles ID's such as IMEI, IMSI & TMSI and allows the user in no time to
identify his target mobiles and to monitor them. The IBIS-II offers a complete set of
capabilities and advance features to allow the user to control the GSM environment and
GSM communication. The user can control the level of service to the target mobiles,
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3. Mass Surveillance ofNetwork Activity
Whereas "lawful intercept" technologies enabled under CALEA and in
ETSI standards enable targeted interception of named individuals to respond
specifically to "lawful" requests, there are now companies trading in
technologies and services that enable large-scale interception, collection, and
analysis of communications. 54 Despite significant growth in bandwidth,
companies are developing and deploying technologies to intercept and collect
data on high-speed streams at various points on communications networks, even
under-sea fibre-optic cables. 5 5 This enables simultaneous interception of large
populations 56 and interception of wide categories of information5 7 for later
analysis. Metadata and content gleaned from these interceptions can be analysed
selectively Jam specific mobiles, perform silent calls, call or SMS on behalf of target
mobile, change SMS messages 'on the fly,' detect change of SIM card or change of handset,
and support Direction Finding system and many additional operational features.").
53 Cell Phone Intercept Apparatus, VIEW SYSTEMS, http://viewsystems.com/pdf/CIA
11_20 06.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) ("Full identification of IMSI, IMEI and TMSI
information and dynamic control capabilities, including comprehensive denial of
service . . . Optional SMS and 'Man In the Middle' Voice decode/record and
forward .. . Proprietary 'TrueStealth' technology supports repatriation of original TMSI and
GCI on most handsets. This allows for rapid information gathering to later use on a
complimentary passive system, and also virtually eliminates the possibilities of being
detected due to switch activity on the network.").
54 See David A. Fulghum, Electronic Blitz, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 29,
2010, at 58.
5 5 d. (includes quotations from Glimmerglass, a provider of interception capabilities,
from their director of business development, Keith May: "We believe our 3D MEMS
technology-as used by governments and various agencies-is involved in the collection of
intelligence from sensors, satellites and undersea fiber systems . . . We are deployed in
several countries that are using it for lawful interception. They've passed laws, publicly
known, that they will monitor all international traffic for interdiction of any kind of terrorist
activity. With that they need to select the wavelengths they want to look at, demultiplex the
signals and then selectively send them places for processing and monitoring.").
5 6 Utimaco, a member of the Sophos Group, advertises the capability of monitoring
virtually unlimited numbers of subscribers, with up to 100,000 simultaneous targets on
telephony networks, and generate metadata at 100,000 records per second. UTIMACO, LIMS
ACCESS POINTS: REALTIME NETWORK MONITORING FOR LAWFUL INTERCEPTION AND DATA
RECOGNITION (2013), available at http://lims.utimaco.com/fileadmin/assets/brochures data
sheetswhitepapers/UTIMACOAPBROCHUREEN.pdf, UTIMACO, DATA RETENTION
SUITE: AUTOMATED DATA RETENTION FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS
(2013), available at http://lims.utimaco.com/fileadmin/assets/brochures-datasheets-white
papers/UTIMACODRSBROCHURE EN.pdf.
57 One company, Amesys, states in a presentation entitled "From Lawful to Massive
Interception" that under massive surveillance you can "[a]nalyse all the communications of
the link" and create an "[a]rchive of all Internet traffic-Smart search engine to recover
communications in the past" and "[a]ll the communications are store[d] in the system."
From Lawful to Massive Interception: Aggregation of Sources, AMESYS (2008),
http://reflets.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/21_20081 0-ISS-PRG-AMESYS.pdf.
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using speaker and language recognition,58 mass location-tracking and more
traditional methods of analysis including keyword and topic searching, and
identifying networks of individuals and groups.59
From our research, these technologies are being deployed across the world,
often without a clear legal framework governing their use. In fact, there are few
cases where countries have explicitly passed laws regulating their use.
II. THE RISKS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE
The technologies we identify beg the question of how our existing legal
frameworks will integrate these new developments. Unfortunately, Parliaments
and Congresses around the world have been slow to respond to such new
technologies and the need for new safeguards. Most legislative activity has been
on the expansion of surveillance powers. While there have been some
developments in laws protecting the personal data of consumers and citizens,
these are relatively silent on the use of surveillance technologies directly by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 60
This is not to say that there is a continual onslaught of surveillance law; in
fact, in some countries proposed communications surveillance policies have
failed to gain the traction necessary to become law. 61 This lack of new law
means that old legal regimes continue to apply, which are often silent on these
new techniques. Without new laws, there are limited means for establishing new
safeguards. This problem may be systemic. As Stephen Smith notes, the
58 Agnitio develops technologies for passive interception and speaker identification.
See About Agnitio, AGNITIO, http://agnitio-corp.com/quienessomos.php (last visited Aug. 13,
2013).
59 For instance, NiceTrack from NICE provides nationwide interception and analysis of
communications metadata to expose and visualise target networks, identify suspicious
patterns, and "handles mass volumes of subscriber data and delivers accurate, reliable target
positioning in real time," and "enables unobtrusive monitoring so that targets are unaware of
its presence and cannot prevent LEAs and intelligence organizations' tracking activities."
NiceTrack Location Tracking Center: Accurate Mobile Tracking Solutions for LEAs and
Intelligence Organizations, NICE SYSTEMS, http://www.nice.com/Intelligence-lea/location-
tracking (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).
60 For instance, see generally Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data.
61 In 2013 alone, proposed communications surveillance policies in Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom have faced significant legislative opposition. See ACCESS TO
COMMUNICATIONS DATA, supra note 37; PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE &
SEC., PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO
POTENTIAL REFORMS OF AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION, at viii (2013),
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary Business/Committees/House of Repre
sentativesCommittees?urlpjcis/nsl2012/report.htm; Laura Payton, Government Killing
Online Surveillance Bill, CBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/
2013/02/11/pol-rob-nicholson-criminal-code-changes.html (describing the withdrawal of
proposed reforms to Canadian surveillance laws).
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location tracking capabilities of cell phones came to Congress's attention in
1994, but as of today there have been no changes to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act clarifying the appropriate legal standard by which
law enforcement agencies may obtain that location data.62 Congress does not
even have adequate information to ascertain the nature and extent of such
surveillance because of inadequate reporting about its use.63 David Gray and
Danielle Citron note that both Democrat- and Republican-sponsored bills
attempting to regulate surveillance died in committee in the 112th Congress.64
As a result, governments that are using these techniques may be doing so
without a clearly applicable legal framework.
Courts have not provided much more insight on how these technologies are
to be used. "Until 2010, no appellate court had ever addressed the legal standard
applicable to cell phone-tracking orders, even though magistrate judges were
issuing tens of thousands of such orders every year without appellate
guidance." 65 Orin Kerr argues that we can only count on courts to step in to
regulate stable technologies. 66  Unlike automobiles and handguns,
communications technologies are in flux. According to Kerr, generally the
courts don't review a technology until long after it has been introduced-the
technology must be used in the course of investigating a criminal offence, it
must yield evidence of a crime, lead to an arrest, and then lead to a
constitutional challenge.67 This takes time. Though the telephone was invented
in 1876, it wasn't until Olmstead in 1928 that the Supreme Court considered
it.68 Pen registers, that record the telephone numbers called from a line, were
not considered until 1979.69
This appears to be changing. In Part III, we are able to identify some recent
lower court cases in which the technologies described in Part II are being
questioned. In the absence of statutory movement, judicial activity may be
required because of the following inherent risks posed by these new
technologies.
62 See Stephen Win. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA's Secret
Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 313, 316 (2012).
63 See id64 David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381,
392 n.41 (2013) (pointing to the Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of
2012, Protecting America's Privacy Act of 2012, and Location Privacy Protection Act of
2012).
65 Smith, supra note 62, at 326.66 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 805 (2004).
67 See id. at 868.
68 See id. at 869 n.404.
69 See id. at 869.
1084 [Vol. 74:6
MODERN SAFEGUARDS FOR MODERN SUR VEILLANCE
A. Secrecy
Unlike traditional search and seizure, these forms of surveillance are by
nature secretive. The implementations of most offensive technologies, mobile
monitoring devices, and mass communications surveillance are designed to
ensure that the individual is unaware of their use.
The secrecy of surveillance is already problematic under regulated regimes.
For instance, Smith notes that under ECPA there is a regime of indefinite
sealing, nondisclosure, and delayed-notice provisions that results in ECPA
surveillance orders being concealed from unsuspecting targets, the general
public, and even other arms of government. 70
This reinforces why notice requirements in the Wiretap Act and Stored
Communications Act are important privacy protections that particularly benefit
those who are subjects of surveillance but never charged with a crime. 71 While
it is possible to notify an individual that his or her device was penetrated using
an offensive technology, it is more challenging to notify every mobile phone
user, or everyone who used a trans-Atlantic cable, that his or her
communications were intercepted, or metadata-collected and stored for later
analysis. Recent events demonstrate the reluctance of at least the U.S. and UK
Governments to make such mass surveillance public. The United States kept
secret for years the now infamous Verizon order, which required the mass
disclosure of communications metadata.72 The likelihood of the public being
notified that fiber-optic cables are being monitored directly by governments is
equally small, as was again demonstrated by the leaks regarding the UK's
ongoing Tempora program that allegedly taps into those very cables.73
Accordingly, courts need to step in to assess, in the first instance, whether these
technologies should even be deployed, and thereafter when and if notification of
targets is appropriate.
B. Directed Surveillance: The Two-Body Problem
The secret use of these technologies is further enabled by the way they
work; they do not necessarily require the participation of third-party service
providers. 74 Each of the techniques identified above can be applied directly
against their targets. Offensive technologies can be uploaded onto the target
device, over the Internet, without seeking approval from a third party. IMSI
catchers and mobile interception devices make it possible for the government
directly to monitor mobile communications without having to involve the
70 See Smith, supra note 62, at 314.
71 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 33, at 186.
72 See Greenwald, supra note 25.
73 See MacAskill et al., supra note 26.
74 This new development runs counter to the current trend in communications
surveillance scholarship to focus on the role of the third-party service providers in
government surveillance.
10852013]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
carriers. Mass surveillance technologies directly tap into data streams, once
physical access to the stream has been obtained. This physical access still may
require some cooperation from third parties. But while the law governing that
access is unclear, there is some evidence that these arrangements are well
established.75 Once access is negotiated, it is possible for governments to use
the mass surveillance technologies to obtain communications data without
having to involve the companies themselves.
As a result of this directed surveillance, there is less of a push for regulatory
and statutory guidance on how the surveillance is conducted. The third-party
service providers, which have pushed for such guidance, either to protect their
users or to immunize themselves from liability, have been removed from the
equation. 76 In many cases the targets may not even know that they have been
under scrutiny. It is thus possible that these techniques are being secretly
deployed without any regulatory guidance at all. Requiring court approval
before these technologies are used, therefore, may be one of the few ways to
assess whether their deployment is consistent with privacy and other legal
concerns.
C. Overbreadth
These techniques also raise scoping problems. A mobile monitoring device,
though geographically limited, will nonetheless collect data on all nearby
mobile phones and devices that connect to it, including those that are unrelated
to a given investigation. Similarly, mass surveillance technologies collect
information on all communications going through a single fiber, cable, and/or
network. 77 With these technologies, the act of interception is no longer targeted
75For an emerging collection of agreements between the U.S. Government and
telecommunications companies around the world, see PUB. INTELLIGENCE, supra note 18,
which includes agreements between international providers and various agencies of the U.S.
Government. According to Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Agreements with Private
Companies Protect U.S. Access to Cables' Data for Surveillance, WASH. POST, July 6, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-06/business/40406049 1_u-s-access-global-
crossing-surveillance-requests, the agreements require companies to maintain what amounts
"to an internal corporate cell of American citizens with government clearances" ensuring
that "when U.S. government agencies seek access to the massive amounts of data flowing
through their networks, the companies have systems in place to provide it securely."
76 See, e.g., Brandon Bailey, Exclusive: Yahoo Seeks To Reveal Its Fight Against NSA
Prism Requests, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 11, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/
business/ci_23635466/yahoo-asks-secret-surveillance-court-unseal-files (describing Yahoo's
recent court battle to reveal its previous efforts to challenge U.S. Government requests for
user information under FISA); Karl Bode, FISA: AT&T, Verizon Lobbyists Win Again,
DSLREPORTS.COM (July 10, 2008), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/FISA-ATT-Veri
zon-Lobbyists-Win-Again-95994 (noting AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint spent millions of
dollars lobbying for an immunity provision to be added to FISA, protecting them from their
previous acquiescence with government requests for user data).
77 The amount of data encountered with mass surveillance necessarily needs some form
of "filtering" because our abilities to monitor, for instance, a 100 GB/s medium would
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at an individual, but rather uses over-collection and analysis to identify specific
targets.
This breadth of application also raises issues of jurisdiction. For instance,
the use of offensive techniques may involve infecting devices in unknown
jurisdictions; the government targeting a device may not know where the device
is located when the offensive technology is deployed. This links back to the
policies mentioned above that are currently being considered by the Dutch
Government and within the Council of Europe that seek to authorize remote
searching of computers in other jurisdictions. 78
Mass surveillance techniques certainly collide on jurisdiction and breadth.
In his analysis of interim updates to FISA, Orin Kerr accepts that surveillance
now "tends to be divorced from the identity and location of the parties to the
communication." 79 Instead, governmental authorities end up searching for
traffic characteristics rather than known identities. 80
In sum, we are inviting techniques that involve the application of
surveillance against unknown entities. These techniques will not only be used to
identify a given suspect, but they can be used to speculate on who should be
targeted by utilizing mass surveillance, such as by identifying all mobile phones
in an area believed to contain criminal suspects or the trawling through an
undersea fibre-optic cable to draw out the identities of individuals
communicating in a specific language and/or using a particular set of words. As
recent disclosures have uncovered, we are in the process of redefining key terms
in our legal safeguards, including "relevant"81 and even "collection." 82 Such
significant changes in the scope of surveillance need to be thoroughly vetted.
require vast amounts of storage, or analysis at the rate of 100 GB/s, both of which are very
difficult to resource. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects "Nearly
Everything a User Does on the Internet," GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013 [hereinafter XKeyscore
Program], http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/3 1/nsa-top-secret-program-online-
data (describing how the collection of vast amounts of information is filtered down for
analysis). As such, the mass monitoring techniques are able to conduct triage by analyzing
and segmenting traffic, which also requires the monitoring of the communications-quite
differently from ignoring all the calls going into a telephone company and only focusing on
the ones being channeled to a specific suspect. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
745-46 (1979) (applying a pen register to monitor the calls of a single individual), with
XKeyscore Program, supra (alleging NSA collects all data then runs searches for
information it deems relevant). These techniques include the ability to identify languages
being spoken, individual speakers, keywords, topics of conversations-all of which means
that much broader categories are "intercepted" in the process of deciding which deserve
further scrutiny. See, e.g., id. As a result we are redefining "interception" as it becomes a
mass surveillance activity for the purpose of weeding out specific data.
7 8 See supra notes 41-42.
79 See Orin S. Kerr, Updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 225, 234 (2008).
8 0 See id.
81 See Lichtblau, supra note 12, at Al; Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Siobhan Gorman,
Secret Court's Redefinition of "Relevant" Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering, WALL ST.
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D. Applicability of Constitutional Protections Against Unreasonable
Search and Seizure
It is by no means clear how constitutional protections may apply to the new
technologies. In Part III, we contend that these technologies raise important
Fourth Amendment concerns. But not all commentators are as convinced. For
instance, some, such as Orin Kerr, focus on a property rights approach to the
Fourth Amendment,83 with its strong focus on exclusion. The police can look
into windows, do aerial searches, use informants-all actions that arguably
violate privacy but don't violate property rights. Under this approach, remotely
accessing a computer might not be a protected invasion if it is not considered a
trespass. It is also not immediately clear if the copying of content from devices
constitutes a seizure. 84
In contrast, as we will discuss in more detail below, Susan Brenner rejects
the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment, and concludes that the
use of an offensive technology to access a computer is "functionally analogous
to the one Katz found himself in," as described in the U.S. Supreme Court's
groundbreaking decision.85 Both the computer user who is connected to a
network and Katz were using a method of communication that is reliant upon
technology with the reasonable assumption that the content of their
communication is private. 86 Brenner also contends that copying data is a
seizure, even though the user retains a copy.87 Instead, she argues that the very
loss of exclusive possession by the individual who owns the device and the data
is the meaningful interference with the possession of the property.88 The
contrasting approaches of commentators like Kerr and Brenner demonstrate that
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to new technologies is far from
settled.
Further challenges arise when we consider the use of mobile monitoring
devices and mass surveillance systems because of the type of information they
collect. Both of these techniques may collect communications metadata in bulk,
sometimes deriving it from intercepted content. Citing Smith v. Maryland and
J., July 8, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323873904578571893758
853344.html.82 See The Government's Word Games When Talking About NSA Domestic Spying,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/wordgames (last visited
Aug. 14, 2013).
83 See Kerr, supra note 66, at 813. He notes: "So long as the surveillance does not
invade the individual's right to exclude others-the very essence of the property right-the
surveillance generally does not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy." Id
84 See id. at 814.
85 Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the
Use of Virtual Force, 81 Miss. L.J. 1229, 1243 (2012).
86 Id
87 See id at 1245.
88 d.
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the third party doctrine (which generally holds that a person cannot retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information given to a third party), Orin
Kerr has raised questions as to whether such metadata is subject to
constitutional protections.89 But because of these new technologies' broad
collection capabilities, the bulk "metadata" collected, especially when it is
generated from content, is not the same as metadata that is "given" to third
parties for processing. For instance, a technique exists to identify the language
of a communication from its content. Some may be quick to reduce the
identification of the language used to the lower status of "metadata," but it first
requires the invasive act of intercepting content. Such surveillance activity was
not foreseen by the Court in Smith v. Maryland.
E. Other Constitutional Concerns
A final area of contention with these techniques is that they may conflict
with other constitutionally protected activities.
In the case of mobile and mass surveillance techniques, the purpose of
collection may be for the identification of groups and individual affiliations. An
IMSI catcher could identify all individuals attending a public protest. Mass
surveillance may be intended to reveal all members of a particular political
organization. Both uses are likely to chill freedom of expression and
association. To date this issue mostly has been missed: pointing to the ACLU v.
NSA, 90 Al-Haramain v. Bush,9 1 and Clapper v. Amnesty92 courts, Neil Richards
contends that, in addressing surveillance, courts ignore First Amendment
concerns.93 We attempt to address this omission by taking such concerns into
account in the following analysis.
III. How SHOULD COURTS APPROACH THESE NEW TECHNIQUES?
The above considerations lead us to the concrete question of how use of
these emerging surveillance technologies should be treated by U.S. courts.
Whether the courts or the legislature are the better forum to address such use is
an open question-but the fact remains that the lower courts, whatever their
competencies, are already being forced to tackle the constitutionality of
offensive technologies, mobile surveillance, and mass surveillance.
For example, the Southern District of Texas recently considered a request
for a warrant authorizing the use of an offensive technology the court described
89 See Kerr, supra note 15, at 596-97.
90 ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 657 (6th Cir. 2007).
91 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1201-05 (9th Cir. 2007).
92 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150-53 (2013).
93 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1934, 1951
(2013).
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as "data extraction software." 94 According to the court, the software would have
allowed the government to "search the [target] computer's hard drive, random
access memory, and other storage media; to activate the computer's built-in
camera; to generate latitude and longitude coordinates for the computer's
location; and to transmit the extracted data to FBI agents." 95 But, the
government did not know whom it would be targeting with the software-
indeed, part of the purpose of the software was to help the government identify
their suspect. The agents intended to install the software on an unknown
"target" computer by sending it to an email address that was implicated in a
bank fraud investigation.
The court questioned the warrant application, raising several issues that
highlight problems that may arise with the use of offensive technologies. First,
the government did not, and seemingly could not, provide assurances that an
innocent computer or person would not become the target of surveillance. 96 By
sending the data extraction software via email, the government might
inadvertently infect any number of computers if that email was opened, for
instance, on a library computer, or in an Internet caf6, or on any computer that
did not belong to the perpetrator. 97 Second, the government failed to explain
how it would limit the collection of data to only that which would be relevant to
the investigation. The court reasoned the broad capabilities of the data
extraction software could not be "fairly described as capturing 'only limited
amounts of data,"' and was especially concerned that innocent people might be
captured on the computer's camera.98 Third, it was not clear to the court that the
government could not obtain the information it sought through less intrusive
means, such as by seeking the identity of the person who owned the email
address from the email service provider via the procedures outlined in the
Stored Communications Act.99 Based on these concerns, among others, the
court refused to issue the warrant.
Two other courts were recently called upon to consider the use of mobile
monitoring devices-in these cases the surveillance technique involved the
more restrained application of the technique of impersonating a mobile base
station in order to gain access to device identifiers, i.e. IMSI catchers. 00 The
9 4 In re Warrant To Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, No. H-13-234M,
2013 WL 1729765, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2013).
95 Id
96 1d. at *4.
97I
9 81d. at *6.
99 Id. at *5.
100 The name of the devices used in these cases was "Stingray." Our understanding is
that the use of these devices in these two cases was limited to capturing the metadata, and
not impersonating a base station to intercept communications content. For a helpful
summary, see Hanni Fakhoury & Trevor Timm, Stingrays: The Biggest Technological
Threat to Cell Phone Privacy You Don't Know About, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct.
22, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-unknown-technological-
threat-cell-phone-privacy.
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Southern District of Texas again heard the first of the two cases, in which the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) wanted to use an IMSI catcher to determine
the cell phone number of a suspected drug dealer. 101 The government sought
authorization for the IMSI catcher under the more lenient statutory standard
established for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.102 In its attempt
to analogize an IMSI catcher to a pen register, the government was vague in its
description of how the device would function, especially with regard to how the
cellphone numbers and other information the stingray would inevitably capture
from innocent cell phone users would be treated.103 The presiding magistrate
judge ultimately concluded an IMSI catcher is not analogous to a pen register
because, among other things, a pen register "seek[s] information about a
particular telephone [number]," while the purpose of the IMSI catcher was to
allow the DEA to determine the phone number of the suspect they were
tracking.104 Accordingly, if the government wanted to use an IMSI catcher, it
would need to seek a warrant, satisfying normal Fourth Amendment
standards. 0 5
Shortly thereafter, the District of Arizona had the opportunity to consider
whether such a warrant could authorize the use of an 1MSI catcher to assist in
locating an individual.106 In United States v. Rigmaiden, the court previously
had issued a warrant allowing the government to use the device to identify the
location of an aircard107 allegedly being used by the defendant to file fraudulent
tax returns.10 8 At trial, the defendant and the American Civil Liberties Union, as
amicus, challenged the sufficiency of that warrant.109 Of particular concern was
the lack of detail provided to the court regarding the capabilities of the mobile
tracking device, specifically its ability to capture innocent third-party cellphone
and aircard information.1 0 The court found that the omission of this detail did
not invalidate the warrant, although its impact appears to have been blunted by
hindsight. As the court noted, the government stayed within the scope of the
warrant it sought:
101 In re The Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (S.D. Tex.
2012).
102Id at 748-51.
103 Id at 749.
104Id at 750-51.
105 Id. at 752.
106 United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CRO8-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz.
May 8, 2013).
107 An aircard, as explained by the court, is a broadband access card, generally provided
by a cellular telephone company, that can be "used to make a wireless connection between a
computer and the Internet." Id. at * 1.
108Id
109Id at *14-22.
110Id at *19-22.
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[T]he agents in this case did not seek to capture third-party cell phone and
aircard information so they could use it in a criminal investigation, nor is there
any evidence that they used the third-party information in that manner. To the
contrary, the evidence presented by the government and Defendant shows that
third-party information was deleted from the mobile tracking device
immediately after the aircard was located. I11
All three of these cases highlight some of the concerns we have already
raised regarding the emerging technologies we are here discussing-their ability
to capture far more information than was previously available to law
enforcement, including significant details about innocent individuals who are in
no way implicated in the investigation. This concern is brought to the fore by
mass surveillance technologies. The vast majority of information caught by
such means will be irrelevant to any criminal or national security investigation.
Recent news reports revealed the U.S. Government is engaging in just such
mass surveillance.1 2 Challenges to certain of those practices are beginning to
reach the courts. 113
As the cases addressing offensive technologies and mobile monitoring
devices demonstrate, courts are struggling with how to fit these new
technologies into the Fourth Amendment framework. The following is our
attempt to provide some guidance on that issue. We conclude that, under current
Supreme Court doctrine, 114 all of these new technologies raise significant
Fourth Amendment concerns. Given the rapid evolution of such surveillance
1 1Id. at *20.112 1n June 2013, the Washington Post and the British newspaper the Guardian,
published a series of leaked slides describing U.S. Government surveillance activities. See
PRISM Data-Collection, supra note 26; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism
Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GuARDIAN, Jun. 6, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. One of the slides
describes the government's ability to collect "communications of fiber cables and
infrastructure as data flows past." PRISM Data-Collection, supra note 26. This is the very
sort of collection to which mass surveillance technologies could be applied. The FBI and
NSA are already collecting data from service providers en masse, as evidenced by another
recently leaked order requiring Verizon to provide the agencies with call detail records for
all of its U.S. users. See Verizon Forced To Hand over Telephone Data-Full Court Ruling,
GuARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-
telephone-data-court-order.
113 See, e.g., ACLU's Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 21-23, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-cv-03994-WHP (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2013), ECF No. 26, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/clapper/2013.08.
26%20ACLU%20PI%2OBrief.pdf.
114We work within current Supreme Court doctrine, despite the many valid criticisms
that have lodged against the current regime, because these cases are the ones the lower
courts, which are currently struggling with these new technologies, are bound to follow. We
also see, in concurrences in United States v. Jones, some movement toward a more holistic
conception of the Fourth Amendment that lower courts may draw on as they tackle these
difficult issues. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
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techniques, and the privacy interests they implicate, the function of a court to
balance the needs of law enforcement against those interests becomes essential.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures.", 1 5
We begin our analysis with the question of whether the use of each of our
enumerated technologies constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment-
the first step in determining whether the considered activity is subject to that
Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Since Katz, to determine whether a
given activity constitutes a search, the Supreme Court most frequently asks
whether the affected individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
object of the search.116 A search occurs if "the individual manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search" and
"society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.""17 More
recently, the Court has revived another conception of what constitutes a search,
holding that a physical occupation of private property for the purpose of
obtaining information also falls within the realm of activities proscribed by the
Fourth Amendment. 118 We find the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
more applicable to the remote-access technologies we here consider, and thus
proceed with our analysis on that basis.119
A. Offensive Technologies
With regard to offensive technologies, Professor Susan Brenner has already
made a persuasive argument that their use, at least on a computer located in a
person's home or office, constitutes a search.120 Professor Brenner follows the
lead of several lower courts in analogizing a computer to a closed container, the
accessing of which is considered a search.121 She further reasons that
connecting a computer to the Internet does not vitiate a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy in its contents. Like the phone booth in Katz, while the
computer may provide its user with a connection to the outside world, in each
case there is evidence that the user expects her content to remain private; "the
115 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
116 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
117 Id.
118 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
119 Orin Kerr contends that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test from Katz is
"more of a revolution on paper than in practice" in that courts seem to focus more on the
interference with property rights. Kerr, supra note 66, at 807. "The result is a critical gap
between privacy rules the modem Fourth Amendment provides and privacy rules needed to
effectively regulate government use of developing technologies." Id.
120 Brenner, supra note 85, at 1239.
1 21 Id.
2013] 1093
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
computer user because she is on her computer in her home or office, and Katz
because he was in a phone booth the door of which was securely closed." 22
We would take Brenner's argument further. Brenner confines herself to
analogizing a computer to a container. But a modem computer is unlike any
other container. It can store vast amounts of information about every aspect of a
person's life, including: financial information, medical records, private
correspondence, diaries recording private thoughts, work product, photographs,
home videos, books, music, records of purchases, and much more. A
computer's massive storage capacity may even encourage the accumulation of
far more data than would previously have been maintained in a person's house
or personal papers.123 And computers are not merely passive receptacles.
Modem computers often incorporate cameras and microphones that, under the
control of an offensive technology, could record even more information about
the computer's surroundings, from private conversations to pictures and video
of the objects and persons who happen to be in front of the camera. Essentially,
computers have become repositories of and portals into the most intimate
aspects of our lives. To access a computer is thus the equivalent of invading a
person's home in the amount and quality of information such access can
provide.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the home receives the
highest level of protection. Almost any intrusion into that sacred space will
constitute a search. As the Court explained in Silverman v. United States: "The
Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long
history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."l 24 It is not much
of a conceptual leap to consider modem computers in the same way and grant
them the same level of protection, especially from offensive technologies that
are capable of opening a window into the most intimate aspects of a person's
life.
This conclusion is bolstered when we assess where a computer is likely to
fall in the spectrum of spaces in which the Court has held a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. At the top of that spectrum, right next to the
home, is a rented hotel room. According to the Court, "[n]o less than a tenant of
122Id at 1243.
123 See Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of
Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 6-8 (2011), http://www.virginialawre
view.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/ohm.pdf (describing in detail the incredible
storage capacity and varied content stored on modem computers).
124 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citation omitted); see also
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) ("In the home, our cases show, all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."); United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) ("At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is
prepared to recognize as justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth
Amendment principle.").
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a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house ... a guest in a hotel
room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures."1 25 A hotel room is unlikely to contain as much private information as
a computer, however. At most, unless it is a long-term rental, such a space will
hold a snapshot of a person's life-luggage, immediately needed sundries, the
person herself. A computer can document much more, potentially years' worth
of intimate details and communications. The virtual wall a computer erects
around our personal information is as essential to our understandings of a
personal space as the physical walls of a hotel room.
The Court has also seen fit to protect personal luggage from unreasonable
search. 126 Much like the locked footlocker at issue in Chadwick, a computer's
contents "are not open to public view," are not "subject to regular inspections
and official scrutiny on a continuing basis," and the computer is "intended as a
repository of personal effects."' 27 All together, these characteristics evidence a
substantial expectation of privacy in the contents of a computer.
This expectation attaches despite the fact that the proliferation of high
capacity "smart" phones and laptops means that many computers can now travel
with a person from inside the home, to the office,128 to anywhere else she may
go. Personal luggage is similarly mobile, yet has been accorded an expectation
of privacy.129 Furthermore, even if we were to assume the contents of a mobile
computer, in and of themselves, are not subject to such an expectation, that
computer is almost certain to be located within a person's home or office for a
significant amount of time each day. Most of us are quite familiar with the
rituals of charging our cellular phones on our nightstands each night, or carting
our laptops between home and office. If, while the computer resides in such a
protected place, the government could not gain access to it without a warrant, 130
125 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
126See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) ("By placing personal
effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination. No less than one who locks the doors
of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is
due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause."); see also Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (holding an officer unreasonably searched a bag by merely
squeezing it to determine if it contained contraband).
127 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
128 The office, like the home, is subject to a heightened level of privacy protection under
which a governmental search, in most circumstances, will be unreasonable without a
warrant. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364, 364 (1968).
129 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
130 As the Court so clearly stated in Kyllo v. United States, no matter what expectation of
privacy might normally attach to the subject of a search, "[i]n our home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). Accordingly, the Court refused to
allow the government to use a new technology to reach into that protected space, even
though the technology made doing so possible without crossing the threshold of the home.
Id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
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then the government should not be able to install an offensive technology on
that device merely because, for some fractional amount of time, it may be
located outside of the protected sphere. This is especially true given the ability
of offensive technologies to not only access the computer or phone, but to also
convert it into a video and audio bug with which to invade the home or office-
something that, pursuant to the Wiretap Act, cannot occur without a warrant. 131
Accordingly, like in a home, a hotel room, a closed container, or personal
luggage, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her
computer, and in its ability to transmit audio, video, or locational information
regarding her surroundings when those surroundings are likely to constitute
traditionally protected areas such as the home and the office. In order to use
offensive technologies to search a computer, therefore, the government must
obtain a warrant, unless one of the very limited exceptions to the warrant
requirement applies. 132
Brenner again astutely concludes that most of these exceptions are unlikely
to attach to the use of offensive technologies.133 When dealing with phone
tapping, another form of electronic surveillance, the Supreme Court came to the
similar conclusion in Katz:
It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the
sort of search and seizure involved in this case. Even electronic surveillance
substantially contemporaneous with an individual's arrest could hardly be
deemed an "incident" of that arrest. Nor could the use of the electronic
surveillance without prior authorization be justified on grounds of "hot
pursuit." And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its
use pursuant to the suspect's consent.134
In most circumstances, therefore, in order to deploy offensive technologies,
the government must obtain a warrant. Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." 35 As we noted, supra, this particularity
requirement may not always be easy to satisfy when deploying an offensive
technology. Following the lead of the Southern District of Texas, courts should
press anyone requesting authorization to deploy an offensive technology for
assurances that probable cause exists that a particular computer or phone
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.").
131 See Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).
132 See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) ("Only where incident to a valid
arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,' may an exemption [to the warrant requirement]
lie." (citations omitted)).
133 Brenner, supra note 85, at 1251.
134 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967).
135 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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contains the sought after evidence. If government officials cannot identify the
computer they plan to infect-as they couldn't in the Texas case because all
they had was an email address, not identifying information for a particular
device-then they should not be allowed to proceed with the deployment of
such intrusive technologies. Furthermore, given that a computer or a
smartphone can store as much information as a home, a warrant should not
authorize uninhibited access. Those seeking to use offensive technologies
should be forced to specify exactly what "persons or things" they intend to
seize, and to implement realistic and detailed minimization procedures to assure
the warrant does not turn into a carte blanche to delve into every aspect of the
subject's life.136
B. Mobile Monitoring Devices
We next look at the mobile phone surveillance technology commonly called
"IMSI catchers." As we noted above, these devices can serve a variety of
surveillance functions. The most basic use is to allow the identification of all
mobile phones within range of the device by impersonating a mobile base
station. Through the use of multiple devices, and triangulation, the IMSI
catchers can also pinpoint the location of every mobile device within range-as
occurred in Rigmaiden. At its most pernicious, the device can directly intercept
content being transmitted by the mobile phone. When the government engages
in any of these activities, a variety of privacy expectations are implicated.
We address each function of the IMSI catcher in reverse order, beginning
with its ability to intercept content. We think there is little question that,
pursuant to the Wiretap Act, if the government wants to intercept content with
these devices it needs to obtain a warrant. 137 We do not delve further into that
conclusion here because, as the two cases we summarize above demonstrate,
IMSI catchers are more often being deployed for their two other functions: to
locate or identify mobile phones within range of the device.
We next consider, therefore, the ability of IMSI catchers to locate a mobile
phone. In their location tracking capabilities, IMSI catchers are analogous to the
beeper the Supreme Court considered in Karo. That beeper was placed in a
container of chemicals before that container was delivered to Karo, who was
suspected of dealing drugs.138 Using the beeper, agents were able to track the
container as it moved from location to location, in the same way that IMSI
catchers would allow the tracking of a mobile phone.139 Several times the
beeper revealed the container was located in private spaces into which the
officers would not normally be able to enter without a warrant, including
136 See Ohm, supra note 123, at 4 (cogently explaining the importance of placing such
limitations on computer search warrants).
137 See Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).
138 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
139d.
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homes.140 As the government admitted to the Court, it would be almost
impossible to determine, prior to using a tracking device-whether it be a
beeper or an IMSI catcher-whether it might result in the tracking of a target
object into a protected space like a home or office.141
This is illustrated by comparing the facts of Karo to its sister case United
States v. Knotts.142 In Knotts, the police similarly deployed a beeper to track a
drum of drug-making material.143 The Court held a warrant was not required for
this tracking in large part because that drum fortuitously never entered a
protected space.144 Instead, the beeper in Knotts only revealed the drum's
location on public roads or outside of the defendant's cabin.145 A year later, in
Karo, the Court faced an almost identical scenario, except that this time it
happened that the container that held the beeper was transported into a home. 146
In these circumstances, the Court found the tracking of the beeper to be an
unreasonable search because the officers were able to use the beeper to
determine the location of the drum within the suspect's home.147 The Court was
unwilling to give the government free rein to use an electronic device to
determine "whether a particular article-or a person, for that matter, is in an
individual's home at a particular time."148 As the government aptly pointed out
in Karo, this holding, for all practical purposes, would force them to "obtain
warrants in every case in which they seek to use a beeper, because they have no
way of knowing in advance whether the beeper will be transmitting its signals
from inside private premises." 49 An IMSI catcher similarly has the ability to
determine "whether a particular article [a mobile phone]-or a person. .. is in
an individual's home at a particular time."150 The Court has repeatedly held
such an electronic invasion, "to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion," is a search that
requires a warrant. 51
For that reason, we contend a warrant should always be obtained prior to
the use of an IMSI catcher given the possibility that its use will lead to an
intrusion into a protected space, most especially a home, but also an office, a
hotel room, and the myriad of other spaces the Court has acknowledged give
rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Given that most people keep their
mobile phones with them at all times, it seems probable that any person tracked,
140Id. at 708-10.
14 1 See id. at 718.
142 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
143Id. at 281-82.
144 Id.
145Id. at 282.
146 Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-10.
147 Id. at 715.
148 d. at 716.
149Id. at 718.
150 Id. at 716.
151 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001); see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.
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even for a relatively short period of time, is likely to enter one of these
protected spaces. It is possible that an I\4SI catcher could be deployed away
from a target's protected space, but unless the device is in the middle of an
uninhabited forest, desert, or at sea, it is likely to (over)collect the identifying
information from other people's devices, and these individuals may very well
be in protected spaces.
In the case of the use of IMSI catchers for long-term location tracking, our
conclusion is bolstered by the sentiments expressed by the concurrences in
United States v. Jones, the Court's most recent statement on location
tracking.152 While the majority opinion in Jones relied on a trespass theory to
conclude the attachment of a GPS device to the defendant's vehicle was a
search, Justices Sotomayor and Alito, in their concurring opinions, both reason
that sustained location tracking could implicate Fourth Amendment concerns.1 53
As Justice Alito so eloquently states, "society's expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in the main, simply
could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual's car for a very long period." 54 That statement applies with equal
force to the movements of individuals, which can often be tracked by tracking
their mobile phones. Justice Sotomayor similarly questions "whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."' 55 To the extent the use
of IMSI catchers for long-term location tracking intrudes on these expectations
of privacy, they provide further incentive for requiring the government to obtain
a warrant before such use.
Similar concerns motivate our consideration of the IMSI catcher's ability to
identify any mobile device in range by capturing its International Mobile
Subscriber Identity ("IMSI"),156 a unique number that identifies each mobile
phone as it connects to a mobile network. The government may be able to use
this capability in a variety of ways, ranging from identifying the IMSI of a
specific mobile device, to cataloguing the identity of every mobile phone within
range of the IMSI catcher. We suspect the latter has already occurred at large
152 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
153 Id. at 954-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
154 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
155 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
156 We focus on the question of whether the capture of IMSIs implicates a reasonable
expectation of privacy. We are well aware of the rigorous debate currently underway
regarding whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her metadata more
generally. See for instance, Kerr, supra note 15, which provides a review of the literature.
While we think that there is a strong case for revisiting the so-called third-party doctrine, and
tend to agree with those who argue modem metadata is analogous to content, a detailed
discussion of that point is beyond the scope of this Article. We have written elsewhere on
this. See Escudero-Pascual & Hosein, supra note 30, at 77-82; International Principles on
the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY &
PROPORTIONATE (July 10, 2013), https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text.
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public gatherings. This ability to identify secretly and accurately every member
of a crowd, via their phone's identifier, goes beyond what government
authorities traditionally have been able to accomplish.157 With normal visual
surveillance, an officer might be able to identify a few members of a rally with
which he was already familiar, but to identify every single person within range
seems to be beyond normal human observational abilities. As such, much like
the unprecedented secret monitoring of movements of concern to Justices Alito
and Sotomayor, this ability of IMSI catchers implicates new privacy concerns.
Under the auspices of protecting freedom of expression and association, the
Court has long held that an organization cannot be compelled by the
government to identify its members.158 People are also guaranteed the right to
express themselves anonymously.' 5 9 Both of these holdings set a reasonable
expectation that a person, if he so chooses, can shield his identity from the
government when exercising his freedom of expression.160 This expectation of
privacy is undermined when the government surreptitiously uses an IMSI
catcher to identify every person at, for instance, a political rally, or a meeting of
the NAACP, or an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. The ability of the
government to unrestrainedly use an IMSI catcher would almost certainly chill
or dissuade certain activities. How likely would a person be to attend a strip
club or an appointment at Planned Parenthood if she thought the government
was recording every person who entered? Accordingly, deploying an IMSI
catcher under such circumstances for the purpose of identifying the mobile
phones within a particular area invades a significant privacy interest.161 As
such, it should not occur without a warrant. And courts should carefully
consider whether such capabilities are even permissible with a warrant, given
the rights of expression and association on which they may impinge.
157 Cf Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("And because GPS
monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design,
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community hostility."' (citation
omitted)).
158See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (holding city could not
criminalize the failure to reveal membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (holding the NAACP need not disclose its membership lists to Alabama).
159 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (protecting
distribution of anonymous campaign literature); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
(striking down ordinance that prohibited the distribution of anonymous handbills).
160See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 274-75 (2002) (persuasively arguing
that a concern for anonymity should be a consideration when determining if the Fourth
Amendment applies).
161 The invasion is made even more troubling by the fact that the government can
operate IMSI catchers in secret, without making their targets aware of the surveillance.
There is no organization, like the NAACP, to push back against the disclosure of its
membership list. The lack of this additional check on government intrusion makes it even
more crucial that police forces and others be forced to seek court approval before using an
IMSI catcher.
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Even where deployment of an IMSI catcher is unlikely to ensnare those
engaged in protected expression or associational activities, it is questionable
whether the government should be allowed to obtain the IMSIs of a large
number of innocent people if its motivation is purely to prevent crime. As the
Court recently reiterated in Maryland v. King, a search may be reasonable, even
without a warrant, if the public interest is so substantial that it outweighs the
privacy interests involved.162 But, that public interest cannot merely be a
"general interest in crime control" if a significant number of innocent people
will be impacted by the search, in however small a fashion.163 For instance, in
Maryland v. King, the Court sanctioned a post-arrest cheek swab to obtain DNA
from all arrestees because of the "significant government interest at stake in the
identification of arrestees" and "the unmatched potential of DNA identification
to serve that interest."1 64 As the cases we discuss above indicate, however,
IMSI catchers are being deployed for "crime control" purposes, that is, to
identify or locate criminal suspects in the course of a criminal investigation-
not merely to verify their identity once they have been arrested on probable
cause. That crime control interest is not sufficient to outweigh the privacy of the
numerous innocent persons that will be caught up in the IMSI catcher dragnet.
Thus, as we discussed earlier, the lower courts are correct to be concerned about
the innocent mobile phone users whose information may be obtained with IMSI
catchers. At the least, such a concern should ensure that a warrant is required
before an IMSI catcher is used. And that warrant should include safeguards
designed to minimize or eliminate the impact on innocent mobile phone users.
As a final point on IMSI catchers, some might contend the act of obtaining
an IMSI is not a search, thus not implicating many of the concerns we have
discussed. In Smith v. Maryland, the Court ruled that the government's use of a
pen register to obtain the phone numbers the defendant dialed was not a search
because the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those
numbers. 165 The Court's decision hinged on the fact that it considered it a well-
known fact that the phone company must receive those numbers in order to
appropriately route any call. 166 If the phone company had access to the numbers
dialed, then the defendant could not reasonably consider them to be private. It is
true that IMSIs are transmitted when a phone or other mobile device connects to
162 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013).163 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38-44 (2000); see also King, 133
S. Ct. at 1981 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Even the common name for suspicionless searches-
'special needs' searches-itself reflects that they must be justified, always, by concerns
'other than crime detection."' (citations omitted)).
164 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977.
165 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
166 Id. at 742-43 ("All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to
the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that
their calls are completed. . . . [I]t is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under
these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain
secret.").
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a network. But unlike the phone number the petitioner dialed in Smith v.
Maryland, it cannot be reasonably said that most persons understand they are
transmitting an IMSI every time they use their mobile phone. In fact, most
mobile device users probably do not even know what an IMSI is, much less that
it is conveyed as part of their phone use. At a more general level, it does not
seem reasonable for a person to expect that merely by carrying his mobile
phone around with him the government would at all times be able and free,
without judicial restraint, to identify him and determine his location. It may be
partly this consideration that caused the Southern District of Texas to refuse to
consider an IMSI catcher as the functional equivalent of a pen register.167 As
Magistrate Judge Owsley pointed out, unlike a pen register where the police are
tracking phone numbers dialed by an already identified phone number, here the
police are trawling for the identification information as an initial matter,
implicating Fourth Amendment concerns. This supports the view that the use of
an IMSI catcher, even for identification purposes, should require a warrant.
C. Mass Surveillance of the Network
Finally, we consider the ability of governments to use mass surveillance
technologies to intercept broad categories of information-both metadata and
content-for later analysis. For the purpose of this discussion, we presume such
interception constitutes a search. While we realize that is a large presumption, it
is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze how each possible form of
information that could be directly intercepted in mass surveillance might affect
the question of whether the initial interception constitutes a search. Although, as
we mention with regard to IMSI catchers, even if a person might not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in individual items of data obtained, capturing
that information on the scale contemplated by mass surveillance may implicate
the privacy concerns raised by Justices Alito and Sotomayor in their Jones
concurrences.1 68 As Justice Sotomayor so eloquently stated with regard to GPS
monitoring:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms. And the Government's unrestrained power to assemble
data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result
is that GPS monitoring-by making available at a relatively low cost such a
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track-may "alter the
167 See In re The Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (S.D. Tex.
2012).
168See supra Part III.B.
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relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society."169
The same can be said of mass surveillance, which has the potential to reveal
even more detail than locational tracking.' 70
Presuming mass surveillance constitutes a search, therefore, it is hard to see
how it could be reasonable. As we discussed with regard to IMSI catchers, the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that searches that are not tied to individualized
suspicion are rarely consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 171 These "special
needs" searches cannot be justified by a "general interest in crime control."' 72
But rather, as in Maryland v. King, a search must be motivated by another
significant government interest such as the identification of arrestees. 173 Mass
surveillance, by its nature, cannot be justified by individualized suspicion. And
unlike an IMSI catcher search, where steps might be taken to limit the impact
on innocent mobile phone users, the whole purpose of mass surveillance is not
to minimize the collection of information from innocents, but in fact to
maximize it in case, sometime now or in the future, it might prove useful. This
leads us to presume that mass surveillance based on a desire to prevent crime is
not consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
As we noted at the beginning of this section, recent attention on U.S.
intelligence activities raises the question of whether such directed mass
surveillance might be justified on national security grounds. With regard to
domestic surveillance, the Court has held that a national security purpose does
not exempt such surveillance from the Fourth Amendment's requirements.1 74 in
fact, domestic national security surveillance may even heighten certain privacy
concerns, as explained by the Court: "Fourth Amendment protections become
the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those
suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept
as the power to protect 'domestic security."'l 75 For these reasons, we think
courts should tread carefully when considering whether national security is a
sufficient justification for mass surveillance.
169 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
170 For a persuasive argument as to why Smith v. Maryland is inapplicable in the mass
surveillance context, even where collection of metadata is involved, see the ACLU's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra
note 113, at 21-23.
171 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1997).
172 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38-44 (2000); see also Maryland
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981-82 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970.
174 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 321-22
(1972) (holding that a search warrant is required when wiretapping in the interest of national
security).
175Id. at 314.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We are in need of a reconceptualization of modem surveillance powers.
Inasmuch as we still consider "interception" as the tapping of a line outside of
someone's home,176 we still believe that surveillance is as targeted in design as
it is in implementation. Neither is necessarily true anymore. Even the emphasis
in the literature on the "third party doctrine" may require re-thinking, as it
presumes that modem surveillance requires third party Internet companies and
telephony providers. As we see with the technologies reviewed in this Article,
the human is no longer necessarily the observer nor the identified target within
modem surveillance. An individual may be placed under communications
surveillance because of his or her location (e.g., near an IMSI catcher), virtual
address (e.g., on the same stream of communications as someone else or using
the same IP address or computer that is then attacked with a Trojan), or
characteristics (e.g., same spoken language, similar topic of conversation). The
surveillance may be authorized because of these characteristics, not because a
known individual is using a particular communications medium. Such practices
only increase the need for legal safeguards to protect our privacy.
Technological change has long been compelling us to rethink the
application of our constitutional values. In theory, Parliaments and Congresses
could act to regulate these technologies, to place them under strict rules. They
have, to date, failed to do so. Instead, we are seeing that the courts are exploring
these questions around new communications surveillance techniques. Our
analysis, based on Supreme Court decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment,
recommends that the courts establish strong boundaries around these new
investigative techniques.
176 Or in the case of Katz, the bugging of a specific telephone booth.
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